Conclusions
The initial euphoria at Ukraine’s withstanding the onslaught of the Russian Army has in some parts of Europe brought about a belief that Ukraine’s victory is now assured, or that an exhausted Russia may soon come to the negotiating table. Ukrainian victory is possible, but will demand hard fighting for some time to come. Having first done little to set a narrative about the war, the Russian government had an opportunity to lay the groundwork for de-escalation in mid-March. It made a deliberate decision to escalate its rhetoric and ideologically mobilise its society. By banning dissent, and by holding local officials accountable for the organisation of patriotic mobilisation, the Russian government is in the process of radicalising its public. Even as the cost of living in Russia rises, therefore, the intent in Moscow is to prolong the fighting. In the short term, this means a major offensive in Donbas. In the medium term, there is an intention to bring about a summer offensive to finish Ukraine off. Given that the Russian government has not yet curtailed its wider ambitions – as demonstrated by its designs on Moldova – it is critical that NATO remains firmly determined to not just support Ukraine to hold Donbas but to prepare for a renewed offensive after.
At the same time, a protracted conflict poses dangers for the West. As Europe enters summer, high energy costs will harm businesses, but there will be a delay between this and job losses. By autumn, there is a risk that recession will coincide with cooling temperatures while citizens will struggle to heat their homes. In this context, support for Ukraine may wither, engagement with Russian disinformation may rise, and Russia’s diplomatic efforts to evade sanctions may gain traction through Western disunity. Limiting Russia’s ability to protract fighting beyond the summer could be effectively enabled by reducing its access to modern armaments. To achieve this, Western countries must conduct a thorough assessment of where their companies are knowingly or inadvertently supplying Russia and cut off these channels. The severing of these channels will not alter the volume of munitions physically stockpiled by Russia for operations in the summer. But the expectations of future manufacture will both shape how much of the stockpile can be expended in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s confidence in the long-term security implications of continuing the war. Reducing dependence on Russian gas must also be a medium-term objective of European policy, even if it will not have an immediate effect. At the same time, NATO must be more engaged in the information struggle beyond its borders; Western efforts to manage their own energy crisis risk being perceived as imposing costs on the very states whose cooperation will be critical in bringing about Russia’s military and political isolation
Although Russia has clearly been weakened by its battlefield setbacks in Ukraine, the combinationof its imperial ambitions and significant coercive power risks destabilization further afield.Moldova is the most prominent example, but as the conflict protracts, Russian operations could pose threats in Serbia and beyond. Coordinated efforts to curtail Russian malign influence in these states – and further afield – will be critical if the crisis in Ukraine is to be contained. Further crises, risking further economic disruption, will prove politically difficult to bear.
Finally, the Russian decision to double down is a high-stakes gamble. If Russia mobilises and eventually overcomes Ukrainian resistance then NATO will face an aggressive, isolated and militarised state. If Russia loses then President Putin has now begun radicalising the population in the pursuit of policies that he will struggle to deliver. Failure to defeat the Ukrainian state after relentlessly comparing it to the Nazi regime may have serious consequences for Putin and those around him. To frame a conflict as existential and to lose must necessarily call the suitability of a leader into question among Russia’s political elites. NATO states therefore need to consider how to manage escalation pathways that follow if Russia is not only defeated in Donbas but finds its newly mobilised and poorly trained troops, with few remaining stocks of precision munitions, unable to deliver a victory in the summer. The death of Putin’s political project is plausible, but it has already inflicted immense damage internationally and risks doing considerably more.
Ugh copying out of a PDF never works.