Ukraine LC Debates, Arguments and Terrible Memes

Conclusions

The initial euphoria at Ukraine’s withstanding the onslaught of the Russian Army has in some parts of Europe brought about a belief that Ukraine’s victory is now assured, or that an exhausted Russia may soon come to the negotiating table. Ukrainian victory is possible, but will demand hard fighting for some time to come. Having first done little to set a narrative about the war, the Russian government had an opportunity to lay the groundwork for de-escalation in mid-March. It made a deliberate decision to escalate its rhetoric and ideologically mobilise its society. By banning dissent, and by holding local officials accountable for the organisation of patriotic mobilisation, the Russian government is in the process of radicalising its public. Even as the cost of living in Russia rises, therefore, the intent in Moscow is to prolong the fighting. In the short term, this means a major offensive in Donbas. In the medium term, there is an intention to bring about a summer offensive to finish Ukraine off. Given that the Russian government has not yet curtailed its wider ambitions – as demonstrated by its designs on Moldova – it is critical that NATO remains firmly determined to not just support Ukraine to hold Donbas but to prepare for a renewed offensive after.

At the same time, a protracted conflict poses dangers for the West. As Europe enters summer, high energy costs will harm businesses, but there will be a delay between this and job losses. By autumn, there is a risk that recession will coincide with cooling temperatures while citizens will struggle to heat their homes. In this context, support for Ukraine may wither, engagement with Russian disinformation may rise, and Russia’s diplomatic efforts to evade sanctions may gain traction through Western disunity. Limiting Russia’s ability to protract fighting beyond the summer could be effectively enabled by reducing its access to modern armaments. To achieve this, Western countries must conduct a thorough assessment of where their companies are knowingly or inadvertently supplying Russia and cut off these channels. The severing of these channels will not alter the volume of munitions physically stockpiled by Russia for operations in the summer. But the expectations of future manufacture will both shape how much of the stockpile can be expended in Ukraine and the Kremlin’s confidence in the long-term security implications of continuing the war. Reducing dependence on Russian gas must also be a medium-term objective of European policy, even if it will not have an immediate effect. At the same time, NATO must be more engaged in the information struggle beyond its borders; Western efforts to manage their own energy crisis risk being perceived as imposing costs on the very states whose cooperation will be critical in bringing about Russia’s military and political isolation

Although Russia has clearly been weakened by its battlefield setbacks in Ukraine, the combinationof its imperial ambitions and significant coercive power risks destabilization further afield.Moldova is the most prominent example, but as the conflict protracts, Russian operations could pose threats in Serbia and beyond. Coordinated efforts to curtail Russian malign influence in these states – and further afield – will be critical if the crisis in Ukraine is to be contained. Further crises, risking further economic disruption, will prove politically difficult to bear.

Finally, the Russian decision to double down is a high-stakes gamble. If Russia mobilises and eventually overcomes Ukrainian resistance then NATO will face an aggressive, isolated and militarised state. If Russia loses then President Putin has now begun radicalising the population in the pursuit of policies that he will struggle to deliver. Failure to defeat the Ukrainian state after relentlessly comparing it to the Nazi regime may have serious consequences for Putin and those around him. To frame a conflict as existential and to lose must necessarily call the suitability of a leader into question among Russia’s political elites. NATO states therefore need to consider how to manage escalation pathways that follow if Russia is not only defeated in Donbas but finds its newly mobilised and poorly trained troops, with few remaining stocks of precision munitions, unable to deliver a victory in the summer. The death of Putin’s political project is plausible, but it has already inflicted immense damage internationally and risks doing considerably more.

Ugh copying out of a PDF never works.

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Conclusions:

The initial euphoria at Ukraine’s withstanding the onslaught of the Russian Army has in someparts of Europe brought about a belief that Ukraine’s victory is now assured, or that an exhaustedRussia may soon come to the negotiating table. Ukrainian victory is possible, but will demand hardfighting for some time to come. Having first done little to set a narrative about the war, the Russiangovernment had an opportunity to lay the groundwork for de-escalation in mid-March. It madea deliberate decision to escalate its rhetoric and ideologically mobilise its society. By banningdissent, and by holding local officials accountable for the organisation of patriotic mobilisation,the Russian government is in the process of radicalising its public. Even as the cost of living inRussia rises, therefore, the intent in Moscow is to prolong the fighting. In the short term, thismeans a major offensive in Donbas. In the medium term, there is an intention to bring about asummer offensive to finish Ukraine off. Given that the Russian government has not yet curtailedits wider ambitions – as demonstrated by its designs on Moldova – it is critical that NATO remainsfirmly determined to not just support Ukraine to hold Donbas but to prepare for a renewedoffensive after.

At the same time, a protracted conflict poses dangers for the West. As Europe enters summer,high energy costs will harm businesses, but there will be a delay between this and job losses.By autumn, there is a risk that recession will coincide with cooling temperatures while citizenswill struggle to heat their homes. In this context, support for Ukraine may wither, engagementwith Russian disinformation may rise, and Russia’s diplomatic efforts to evade sanctions may gaintraction through Western disunity. Limiting Russia’s ability to protract fighting beyond the summercould be effectively enabled by reducing its access to modern armaments. To achieve this, Westerncountries must conduct a thorough assessment of where their companies are knowingly orinadvertently supplying Russia and cut off these channels. The severing of these channels will not alter the volume of munitions physically stockpiled by Russia for operations in the summer. But theexpectations of future manufacture will both shape how much of the stockpile can be expended inUkraine and the Kremlin’s confidence in the long-term security implications of continuing the war.Reducing dependence on Russian gas must also be a medium-term objective of European policy,even if it will not have an immediate effect. At the same time, NATO must be more engaged in theinformation struggle beyond its borders; Western efforts to manage their own energy crisis riskbeing perceived as imposing costs on the very states whose cooperation will be critical in bringingabout Russia’s military and political isolation.

Although Russia has clearly been weakened by its battlefield setbacks in Ukraine, the combinationof its imperial ambitions and significant coercive power risks destabilisation further afield.Moldova is the most prominent example, but as the conflict protracts, Russian operations couldpose threats in Serbia and beyond. Coordinated efforts to curtail Russian malign influence in thesestates – and further afield – will be critical if the crisis in Ukraine is to be contained. Further crises,risking further economic disruption, will prove politically difficult to bear.

Finally, the Russian decision to double down is a high-stakes gamble. If Russia mobilises andeventually overcomes Ukrainian resistance then NATO will face an aggressive, isolated andmilitarised state. If Russia loses then President Putin has now begun radicalising the populationin the pursuit of policies that he will struggle to deliver. Failure to defeat the Ukrainian state afterrelentlessly comparing it to the Nazi regime may have serious consequences for Putin and thosearound him. To frame a conflict as existential and to lose must necessarily call the suitability of aleader into question among Russia’s political elites. NATO states therefore need to consider how tomanage escalation pathways that follow if Russia is not only defeated in Donbas but finds its newlymobilised and poorly trained troops, with few remaining stocks of precision munitions, unable todeliver a victory in the summer. The death of Putin’s political project is plausible, but it has alreadyinflicted immense damage internationally and risks doing considerably more.

Here you go.

This is pretty depressing. But it screams to me that the faster and harder Russia is defeated, before this insanity can get off the ground, the less risky for the world as a whole.

If Russia comes out ahead on this, I predict we’re going to face a nuclear showdown at some point, but on their terms. Putin or whoever is leading will have time to make sure all the military ducks are in a row, and the people are whipped into a frenzy. Whereas now the leadership situation is clearly in disarray and the Russian people are just getting used to the new way of life.

IMO it’s absolute fantasy to think that appearsing Russia now means we can just go back to something like the status quo indefinitely.

Personally I don’t get giddy at all about the new weapons. But I do spend several hours a day apoplectic about what’s happening to the people of Ukraine, and worrying about what the world will look like if they lose.

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I got COVID when I started going out in south Florida on the advise of my therapist because I’d slipped back into a severe depressive state after quarantining for a couple months. There’s no evidence that I spread COVID to anyone, including my roommate who lived with me for two days before I knew I was positive and I went back into isolation for the appropriate amount of time. And I took plenty of flack for it here. Don’t see how that disqualifies me from pointing out somethjng that should be so obvious as that cheerleading for the MIC is a pretty bad look.

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Sounds like you aren’t the target audience for those tweets about weapons being shipped to Ukraine. I wonder who it could be?

Who’s next is doing gods work on twoplustwo right now making sure that threads about banning regular Russians from poker sites stay free of any mention of American hypocrisy in the matter

Good job man those threads aren’t racist cesspools or anything

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Some people are excited about Ukraine possibly winning this war because of the hope that a bad guy, Putin, might be punished somehow, since we don’t seem to have any of that going on in this country. We have clear good guys to root for and clear bad guys to root against.

The Ukrainian cause is pure, is unambiguously the morally correct side to support. There’s no choosing between the lesser of two evils here. Some people are going to react negatively from the good feelings that come from knowing you’re aligned with the good guys.

Interesting word choice

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https://mobile.twitter.com/doulbedoink/status/1517550595757981697

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I’m old enough to remember when you told us the Ukraine invasion wasn’t happening and the reporters wearing helmets were chickenshits or outright scam artists. Keep posting. You will hit one eventually!

Apparently, you’re old enough that your memory is failing. Nothing like this happened.

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Very very tough to prove you are a lying pos lol

Yikes man

[ ] Ukraine invasion is fake
[ ] reporters wearing helmets are chickenshits or outright scam artists

What was your point then? You posted a bunch of other similar posts at the time insinuating reporters wearing helmets were CNN being fake? Come on man this is just horrible at this point. Do you really want me to go get all the posts?

My point is you are a career elon stan. That’s sad. You were shitposting as people were getting killed in Ukraine. Maybe time to re-evaluate yourself.

Dude you’ve wildly misread and are being a dick needlessly

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I read that as him going after CNN, not denying the invasion.

Oh enlightened one, what is something most people here believe about the Ukraine conflict that you know to be false?

This. Examples or stfu.

It’s actually America’s fault!