Capitalism inherently has social stratification. Or rather, all societies have stratification and capitalism naturally stratifies along lines of economic class and the division of labor.
Race is the defining thread of American history. You can’t talk about America without talking about race. American capitalism has a natural inclination to stratify along racial lines. Is that because it is inherently a facet of a multicultural society or is it merely a convenient fault line that the wealthy elites are naturally inclined to seek out and exploit? That can be debated, but I would argue that capitalism does not need racism to exist, yet may amplify racism wherever race exists. However, less capitalism won’t necessarily lead to less racism.
I do think though that at least American capitalism encourages racism because thoughts like you’re the only person responsible if you aren’t successful, makes it easy to say this whole race isn’t successful and it’s their own fault.
Also when everyone is guaranteed healthcare, housing, food etc, makes it easier to agree that all people are worth caring about and easier to see and believe that other people think that.
American capitalism discourages anti-racism because that form of capitalism is built upon the myth of individualism and anti-racism has a strong component of identity politics, which is contrary to individualism. Then, you have some anti-capitalists who seem to dislike race-based idpol because they see it as competition for class-based identity. I guess what I am saying is, “Fuck individualism.”
Doesn’t have to be fuck individualism, I see people as individuals, just fuck the mantra of a persons success is only a result of how hard they work bullshit
I suppose I could say “fuck excessive individualism”, but that’s no fun. I oppose the idea that the individual is the primary political unit of analysis or that society is merely the sum of discrete individuals.
Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the majority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of the public authorities. But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannising are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such ex- treme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.
People are accustomed to believe, and have been encouraged in the be- lief by some who aspire to the character of philosophers, that their feel- ings, on subjects of this nature, are better than reasons, and render rea- sons unnecessary. The practical principle which guides them to their opinions on the regulation of human conduct, is the feeling in each person’s mind that everybody should be required to act as he, and those with whom he sympathises, would like them to act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself that his standard of judgment is his own liking; but an opinion on a point of conduct, not supported by reasons, can only count as one person’s preference; and if the reasons, when given, are a mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other people, it is still only many people’s liking instead of one. To an ordinary man, however, his own preference, thus supported, is not only a perfectly satisfactory rea- son, but the only one he generally has for any of his notions of morality, taste, or propriety, which are not expressly written in his religious creed; and his chief guide in the interpretation even of that. Men’s opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blamable, are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the con- duct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.